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THE SUPREME COURT'S NATURAL GAS ACT:
NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO. v. KANSAS
COMPLETES JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

Granville Dutton*

SYNOPSIS
The recent decision by a bare majority of the Federal Supreme
Court in the case of NMorthern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas' struck
down a Kansas conservation order requiring ratable gas production in the Kansas Hugoton Field. The five men found that the
ratable-take order posed a threat to comprehensive federal regu3
lation2 under the Natural Gas Act.
*Mr. Dutton is

to Sun Oil Company's Southwest In doing so, the Court, as dissentDivision Office Dallas, Texas, as ing Justice Harlan put it, "builds
engineer and attorney in the pro- a rule that, if consistently applied,
well des
ration section dealing with oil
troy the conservation
regulation by state administrative may
4
agenis and natural gas control powers of the States."
The five-man opinion imputes to
by the Federal Power Comnmission. He graduated from the U. S. Congress the subjection of gas proNaval Academy in 1945 with a
bachelors degree in engineering duction to federal control. The fact
and from Southern Methodist is that Congress has stated that the
University's School of Law in Natural Gas Act "takes no authority from State commissions, and is
1957.
so drawn to complement and in no matter usurp State regulatory
authority."5 State ratable-take laws date back to 1913,6 twentyfive years prior to the Natural Gas Act. The Court previously had
recognized that "the Act, though extending federal
7 regulation, had
no purpose or effect to cut down state power"
1-U.S.-, 83 Sup.Ct. 646, 9 L.Ed.2d *601 (1963).
283 Sup.Ct. at 651, 9 L.Ed.2d at *608.
852 Stat. 821 (1939), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
4 83 Sup.Ct. at 658, 9 L.Ed.2d at *616.
5H.R. REPn.No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
0 Okla. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 198, §§ 2-3, 52 OxLA. STAT. §§ 232-233
(1961).
7 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507,
517, 68 Sup.Ct. 190, 195, 92 L.d. 128, 138 (1947).
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Stripped of the interpretation that Congress is responsible, the
Kansas decision stands out clearly as judicial legislation. As such,
it violates Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution
which vests all legislative power in Congress and also violates the
Tenth Amendment which reserves all powers not delegated to the
federal government to the states, or to the people.
The decision provides the basis for centralizing all regulation
of gas production in the Federal Power Commission. Such a
centralization will facilitate the socialization of the gas industry
by giving the federal government management of the essential
means of production. Since oil is always produced jointly with
gas, it is not likely that oil production can long withstand federal
control if gas production is so completely subjugated to the FTC.
The Kansas decision, coupled with the Phillips8 case of 1954,
places the oil and gas industry in the same position as the agricultural industry twenty years ago. To avoid another such colossal
regulatory fiasco, Congress should act immediately to repel this
latest judicial invasion of its constitutionally delegated authority.
If it fails to do so, the system of checks and balances which protects
all liberty from governmental tyranny will suffer a critical, if not
killing, blow.
THE KANSAS CASE
Northern Natural Gas Company purchases gas from over
a thousand gas wells in the Kansas Hugoton Field. Under its
original purchase contracts with Republic Natural Gas Company,
Northern Natural was obligated to take or pay for sufficient gas
from designated Republic wells to supply sixty percent of Northerns requirements for a defined area of Iowa and Nebraska. In
1952, a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court9 modified that
contract to obligate Northern to take only those volumes permitted to be produced under Kansas Corporation Commission gas
allocation orders for the Hugoton Field. Northern's other purchase contracts in the field expressly provide that their takes
from other producers are subject to the provisions of their Republic contract.
Until 1958, Northern was able to take not only the allowable
production from Republic wells but also the allowable production
from other wells to which it was connected. In that year, Northern could no longer take the full allowables because the Federal
Power Commission refused to issue the public convenience and
necessity certificates required for Northern's planned expansion
of its system. Without governmental authority to expand, Northern could not increase its sale at the rate the allowables of the
wells to which it was connected increased; an increase which
sPhbilps Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 74 Sup.Ct. 794, 98
L.Ed. 1035 (1954).
9 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Republic Natural Gas Co., 172 Kan. 450,

241 P.2d 708 (1952).
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Northern has contended in a Kansas court action exceeded the
actual increase in market demand.
Unable to increase takes sufficiently to allow all wells to
produce their allowables, Northern interpreted its contractural
obligations to require taking the published allowables of the Republic wells and allocating the remainder of its market to the
other Kansas Hugoton wells to which it was connected. Northern's
action under this interpretation resulted in the Republic wells
being produced at a substantially higher rate than the other wells
delivering to Northern's system, thereby failing to meet the statutory requirement of "ratable taking."
Ratable taking generally refers to purchasers and pipelines
permitting the wells to which they are connected to produce at
relative rates which afford each owner the opportunity of producing his share of the oil and gas. Where production from wells
is restricted by operation of proration regulations, ratable taking
is generally administered by taking from each well the same proportion of the allowables assigned to the wells. In the subject
case, ratable taking would have been accomplished .had Northern
taken from each well to which it was connected the proportion
of such well's allowable equal to a fraction, the numerator of which
would have been Northern's requirements and the denominator
the sum of the allowables of the wells to which it was connected.
The first ratable taking statute was enacted by Oklahoma in
1913. It provided that any person taking gas from a gas field
"shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to his
interest in the gas."10 Kansas first passed a ratable take statute in
1935, three years prior to the Federal Natural Gas Act of 1938.
This statute provided that the state corporation commission "shall
so regulate the taking of natural gas from any and all such common sources of supply within this state so as to prevent the inequitable or unfair taking from such common source of supply
.... ,,jn Other major gas producing states now have, and did have
in 1938, statutes with similar provisions.' 2
The stricken Kansas Corporation Commission order was a
typical ratable-take order for gas which stated that "in each common source of supply under proration by this Commission, each
purchaser shall take gas in proportion to the allowables from all
the wells to which it is connected." 13 This order of statewide application superseded an earlier order which had required Northern
to take gas ratably from all wells to which it is connected in the
Kansas Hugoton Field.
The rule announced by the five-man majority in the Kansas
1052 OKLA. STAT. § 233 (1961).
2Kx. GEN. STAT. § 55-703 (1935).
12LA. STAT. ANN.-R.S. 30:41 (West 1950). N. MEx. STAT. ANN. §
65-3-13 (c and d) and § 65-3-15 (d) (Smith 1953). Txx. Crv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6008, §§ 10, 12, 13, 14 and art. 6049a, § 8a (Vernon 1962).
13 K.C.C. Rule 82-2-219, effective February 8, 1960.
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invalidated
ratable-take
case carries implications far beyond the
order, as is shown in the following opinion:
"The federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for
direct state regulation of the prices of interstate wholesales
of natural gas or for state regulations which would indirectly
affect the ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively and effectively the transportation and
sale of natural gas and to achieve the uniformtiy of regulation which was an objective of the Natural Gas Act. They
therefore invalidly invade the federal agency's exclusive domain."' 4
Enforcement of such a broad rule would effectively terminate
the historical state control over oil and gas conservation. Virtually
every state conservation order-whether it applies to safe drilling
practices, protection of fresh water, measurement and storage
standards, production rules, or routine reporting regulations-indirectly affects the regulated price of natural gas. Such orders all
involve some expense or alter in some manner the supply of gas.
This is true even if the state conservation order concerns an oil
well or reservoir since the FTC insists upon allocation of joint
oil and gas production costs in determining the regulated price
of gas.
The majority does not stop with striking down state orders
indirectly regulating the price of gas, but find no sanction for
orders acknowledged to be within the scope of a state's power
if those means threaten effectuation of the federal regulatory
scheme.' 5
The five justices required but one short paragraph to dispose
of the first ground upon which the Kansas Supreme Court had
upheld the order under attack, The Kansas court had found the
ratable-take order constituted state regulation of the "production
of gathering" of gas, which is specifically exempt from FPC jurisdiction by Section 1(b) of the Natural Gas Act.16
The prevailing opinion of the federal court refers to another
17
five-man federal decision-Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
which first subjected independent producers to federal regulation
-to reject the applicability of the exempting language on the
grounds Northern was not involved in "production and gathering
in the sense that those terms are used in 1(b)."18
The second ground relied upon by the Kansas court was
that the contested order in no way involves the price of gas. In
rejecting this argument, Justice Brennan, writing for himself and
14 83 Sup.Ct. at 650, 9 L.Ed.2d at *607.
's Id. at 652, 9 L.Ed.2d at *609.
1615 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
17347 U.S. 672, 74 Sup.Ct. 794, 98 L.Ed. 1035 (1954).
8
3 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas, -U.S.--,
83 Sup.Ct. 646, 649,
9 L.Ed.2d *601, 0606.
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the other four men making up the majority, formulated the broad
rules referred to above. As justification for such rules, he writes:
"The Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of 'all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce,
whether by a pipeline company or not and whether occurring before, during or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company."1 9 The internal quote is not from the Natural Gas Act or
any congressional report but is once again from the Phillips decision.
The holding also states that "Congress has given the Federal
Power Commission paramount and exclusive authority" over the
"intricate relationship between the purchasers' cost structure and
eventual costs to wholesale consumers." To require purchasers
to take ratably "could seriously impair FPC's
now taking unratably 20
authority to regulate."
The opinion further holds that the ratable-take order must be
nullified to assure the effectuation of the comprehensive regulation
ordained by Congress. Again Justice Brennan finds that "the state
regulation must be subordinated when Congress has so plainly
occupied the regulatory field."21 The majority also find strength
in the footnoted statement that persistent legislative efforts to
narrow the scope of the broader exclusive federal
jurisdiction con22
ferred by the statute have been unavailing.
The decision also rejects a suggestion of the FC to remand
the case to the Kansas Supreme Court to resolve the effect of the
conservation order on the take-or-pay provisions of Northern Natural's so-called Republic "A" contract. This provision had been
interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1952 to mean that
Northern was in compliance if it took the volumes permitted under
Kansas proration orders. Therefore, FPC took the position that
the ratable-take order would not affect price structure if it relieved
Northern of the obligation to take full allowables from Republic
"A" wells. The five-man majority refused to remand for three
reasons: (1) the Kansas court chose to decide the federal question in favor of the validity of the orders; (2) the contract was
not in issue in the case; and (8) the real question is whether the
state orders may stand 2in3 the face of the pervasive scope of federal
occupation of the field.
Justice Harlan wrote the dissenting opinion for himself, Stewart, and Goldberg. He endorsed the FC suggestion to remand,
pointing out that in 1958 the Supreme Court dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question an appeal presenting substantially
the same broad federal question decided by the majority.
The dissent notes the historical application of ratable-take
19 Id. at 650, 9 L.Ed.2d at *607.
2o Id. at 651, 9 L.Ed.2d at *608.

21 ]bid.
22 Id. at 650, 9 L.Ed.2d at *607.
23 Id. at 654, 9 L.Ed.2d at *611.
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orders to purchasers and finds such application to be the only
practical one since an individual producer cannot require ratable
production by others over whom he has no control. Justice Harlan
could not reconcile the majority's recognition of the state's right
to adopt valid conservation measures with the holding that such
measures should be struck down if they merely threaten comprehensive federal regulation. He points out that all such conservation orders carry the possibility of affecting costs and warns that
on this insecure foundation the Court builds a rule that, if consistenfly applied, may well destroy the conservation powers of
the states." 24
The dissenting opinion documents congressional intent in
passing the Natural Gas Act. Referencing the house committee
report that the act "takes no authority from State commissions
and is so drawn to complement and in no manner usurp State
regulatory authority,"25 this opinion notes that:
cc

. it is beyond dispute that when Congress enacted the

Natural Gas Act in 1988 it did not intend to deprive the states
of any regulatory powers they were then deemed to possess
under the constitution. Rather, the act was intended only to
fill the 'gap ... thought to exist at the time the Natural
Gas Act was passed' by providing for federal regulation of
those aspects of the natural gas business that the States were
believed to be constitutionally incapable of reguat that 2time
6
lating."

Justice Harlan points out that ratable-take statutes date back
prior to the Natural Gas Act and, "since the state had the power
to issue an order at the time the Natural Gas Act was 2passed,
7
nothing in the act can now be considered to withdraw it."
The dissent also notes that the majority opinion is based upon
the premise that Northen's Republic contractual obligations are
unaffected by the Kansas Commission's ratable-take order. Should
the contract's take-or-pay provisions be modified by the valid
application of the state's police powers under a fundamental principle of contract law, obviously there would be no conflict with
FPC pricing authority. Under another-or perhaps, former- fundamental principle of constitutional law, a remand to the Kansas
Supreme Court to determine that question of state law would
obviate the necessity of the Federal Supreme Court deciding at
the time any question of federal law.
THE NATURAL GAS ACT OF CONGRESS
As mentioned above, the producing states long ago enacted
24 Id. at 658, 9 L.Ed.2d at 0616.
25 Id. at 657, 9 L.Ed.2d at -615.

2s6Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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legislation to regulate the production of natural gas in order to
protect the correlative rights of the various owners of a common
reservoir and, to prevent waste. The states at an even earlier date
regulated gas distributing companies as utilities granted monopolistic franchises. A number of these companies grew to interstate
proportions which made it difficult for states to determine actual
costs upon which rates for such companies were to be based. The
commerce clause of the Constitution 28 provided an additional limitation on the authority of the state. In fact, the Supreme Court
specifically held that transportation of gas through pipe lines to
comanother state for sale to distributing companies is interstate
merce over which state authorities have no rate control.29 A Senate
resolution ° requested the Federal Trade Commission to conduct
an investigation. In 1936 the FTC issued a report recommending
federal legislation in this field. At the next session of32 Congress
the Natural Gas Act31 was passed. The legislative history indicates
that Congress intended federal regulation to be confined to interstate transportation of gas, to complement the power of the states
and produce a harmonious regulation of the industry without

usurping the state regulatory powers or encroaching upon their
jurisdiction.
The Congressional Act declared that "the business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the
public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation in matters relating to transportation of natural gas and the
sale thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the
public interest."3 3 It provides that all rates and charges by any
natural-gas company shall be just and reasonable34 and that rates
which are not just and reasonable are unlawful. The Act does
not define just and reasonable but defines a natural-gas company
as "a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas
for resale"3 5 and defines interstate commerce as "commerce between
any point in a State and any point outside thereof, or between
points within the same State but through any place outside thereof."36 The Act states that its provisions "shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas . . . or to the producart. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 44 Sup.Ct. 544,
68 L.Ed. 1027 (1924).
80 S. Res. No. 83, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CoNG.Rc. 3054 (1928).
3152 Stat. 821 (1939), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
82S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A (1936); H.R. REP. No.
2651, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R. RPn. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937). See Comment, 44 GEO. LJ. 695 (1956).
28 U.S. CONST.
29

33

15 U.S.C. § 717a (1958).

8415 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1958).
85 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1958).
8615 U.S.C. § 717a(7) (1958).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1964

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 1 [1964], Iss. 1, Art. 6

TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 1, No. I
7
tion or gathering of natural gas."2 The Federal Power Commission
is charged with administration of the Act and is given the necessary administrative powers to enforce it.
In 1947, the Supreme Court, without dissent, upheld the obvious Congressional intent in the case of Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Public Serv. CommnV 8s where it said:
"We have emphasized repeatedly that Congress meant to
create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme, complementary in its operation to those of the states and in no
manner usurping their authority. 3 9... The Act, though extending federal regulation, had no purpose or effect to cut
down state power.40 . . . The Act was drawn with meticulous
regard for the continued exbrcise of state power, not to
handicap or dilute it in any way. This appears not merely
from the situation which led to its adoption and the legislative history, but most plainly from the history of See. 1 (b). 41
. . . These considerations all would lead to the conclusion
that the states are not made powerless to regulate the sales
in question by any supposed necessity for uniform national
regulation but that on the contrary the matter is of such
high local import as to justify their control, even if Congress
had given no indication
of its intent that state regulation
42
should be effective."
In answer to the charge that Congress, by enacting the Natural Gas Act, had "occupied the field," i.e., the entire field of
regulation, the Court replied: "The exact opposite is the fact.
Congress it is true occupied a field. But it was meticulous to
take in only
territory which this Court has held the states could
43
not reach."
Before the Panhandle Eastern case the Supreme Court had
never held that states could not reach ratable-take territory. Three
years later, that Court specifically upheld a gas ratable-take order
44
in the case of Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.
Not only was there no dissent from this affirmation of state authority to institute ratable-take orders, but justice Black was of the
opinion that the appeal from the order should have been dismissed as frivolous As late as 1958, the United States Supreme
Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question an
appeal from a Texas Railroad Commission order requiring the
U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
38332 U.S. 507, 68 Sup.Ct. 190, 92 L.Ed. 128 (1947).
39 Id. at 520, 68 Sup.Ct. at 197, 92 L.Ed. at 139.
40 Id. at 517, 68 Sup.Ct. at 195, 92 L.Ed. at 138.
41Tbid.
42 Id. at 523, 68 Sup.Ct. at 199, 92 L.Ed. at 141.
43 Id. at 519, 68 Sup.Ct. at 196, 62 L.Ed. at J139.
44340 U.S. 179, 71 Sup.Ct. 215, 95 L.Ed. 190 (1950).
3715

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol1/iss1/6

8

Dutton: The Supreme Court's Natural Gas Act: Northern Natural Gas Co. v.

19641
SUPREME COURTS NATURAL GAS ACT
39
principal purchaser45in a gas field to purchase ratably from operators in the field.
In 1947, the Court also handed down Interstate Natural Gas
Co. v. FPC, 46 in which the following rule was set out:
"As was stated in the House Committee Report, the 'basic
purpose' of Congress in passing the Natural Gas Act was 'to
occupy the field in which the Supreme Court has held the
States may not act.' In denying the Federal Power Commission jurisdiction to regulate the production or gathering of
natural gas, it was not the purpose of Congress to free companies such as petitioners from effective public control. The
purpose of that restriction was, rather, to preserve in the
States powers of regulation in the areas in which the States
are constitutionally competent to act.... Clearly among the
powers thus reserved to the states is the power to regulate
the physical production and gathering of natural gas in the
interest of conservation or of any other consideration of
legitimate local concern. It was the intention of Congress
to give the States full freedom in these matters. Thus, where
sales, though technically consummated in interstate commerce, are made during the course of production and gathering and are so closely connected with the local incidents of that
process as to render rate regulation by the FTC inconsistent
or a substantial interference with the exercise by the state
of its regulatory
function, the jurisdiction of the FTC does
47
not attach."
Two years later, the Court confirmed this ruling by holding
in FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.48 that the "legislative
history of this act is replete with evidence of the care taken by
Congress to keep the power over the production and gathering
of gas with the states." 49 Copious footnotes support this statement.
The decision went on to say:
"Thus for over ten years the Commission has never claimed
the right to regulate dealings in gas acreages. Failure to use
such an important power for so long a time indicates to us
that the Commission did not believe the power existed. In
the light of that history we should not by an extravagant,
even if abstractly possible, mode of interpretation push powers over transportation and rates so as to include production
... . We cannot attribute to Congress the intent to grant
such far-reaching powers as implicit in the Act when that
45
Permian Basin Pipeline Co., v. Railroad
appeal dismissed 358 U.S. 37, 79 Sup.Ct. 21, 3
46331 U.S. 682, 67 Sup.Ct. 1482, 91 L.Ed.
471d. at 690, 67 Sup.Ct. at 1487, 91 L.Ed.
48337 U.S. 498, 69 Sup.Ct. 1251, 93 L.Ed.
49 Id. at 511, 69 Sup.Ct. at 1258, 93 LEd.
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1742 (1947).
at 1748.
1499 (1949).
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body has endeavored to be precise and explicit
0
the limits to the exercise of federal power."G
The Federal Power Commission also complied with the Congressional intent of the Natural Gas Act. Initially, the problem
was presented to the Commission in the matter of In re Columbian
Fuel Corp.51 After reviewing the legislative history of the Act, the
Commission refused to claim jurisdiction over the producer and
held that it was not the intent of Congress that jurisdiction be
extended to persons whose only sales are made as an incident to,
and immediately upon, the completion of the production and gathering process. In more than fifteen instances prior to 1950 the
Commission adhered to that opinion in refusing to exercise its
regulatory powers in such cases. 2
After the Interstate case, the Commission issued Order 139
which, like the Kerr Bill, 53 removed arm's length sales made by

independent producers from federal regulation. After the Kerr
Bill was vetoed, 54 the Commission rescinded Order 139. However,
Order 154, the rescinding order, stated that the Commission's policy would not include investigating producers and gatherers generally but such investigations would be made only where rates
appeared excessive on sales that materially affected interstate
commerce.
THE SUPREME COURT'S NATURAL GAS ACT
The Supreme Court's early decisions involving the Natural
Gas Act were in the field of rate determinations for interstate
pipeline companies. In 1942, the Court overturned "fair value"
rate determinations in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.5 5 by holding that there is a zone of reasonableness within which the Commission is free to act to decrease rates which are not the lowest
reasonable rates without being subject to court authority to set
aside as being too low. The Court further broadened the Commission's rate-making discretion in 1944 with their decision in
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.5" which recognized the validity of
"pragmatic adjustments" and ended judicial inquiry if the total
effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable. This effectively transformed the Commission's rate-making
power into a price-fixing one.
The Supreme Court first used judicial fiat to expand the jurisdiction of the FPC in the case of Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v.
50 Id. at 513, 69 Sup.Ct. at 1260, 93 L.Ed. at 1509.

51 2 F.P.C. 200 (1940).
52 Jacobs, Problems Incident to the Marketing of Gas, 5th AN1.

INST.

.AND GAs LAW AND TAX 271, 281 (1954).
53 H.R. REP.No. 1758 & S. REP. No. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).

ox O

CoNG.REc. 5304 (1950).
55 315 U.S. 575, 62 Sup.Ct. 736, 86 L.Ed. 1037 (1942).
56320 U.S. 591, 64 Sup.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944).
5496

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol1/iss1/6

10

Dutton: The Supreme Court's Natural Gas Act: Northern Natural Gas Co. v.

41
SUPREME COURT'S NATURAL GAS ACT
19643
FPC,57 a rate case in which the Commission included the production properties of the regulated natural-gas company in its rate
base. Four justices dissented and a fifth wrote a concurring opinion
upholding the result of the case under the Hope total effect
doctrine but describing as fantastic the Commission's method of
including such properties worth three million dollars in the rate
base at less than five thousand dollars.
In FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co.,58 the Court held that a wholly
intrastate natural-gas company was subject to federal regulation
because the intrastate company continued the movement of gas
through lines continuing the high pressures of the interstate lines.
Further Congressional action overturned this decision with a
specific amendment removing any federal jurisdiction over intrastate operations subject to state regulation. The amendment also
provided that a certification from the state agency that it has
regulatory jurisdiction which it is exercising over such operations
shall constitute conclusive evidence of such regulatory power
or jurisdiction. 59
In the Interstate60 case the Court, although recognizing that
the Congressional intent of the production and gathering exemption was to preserve the states' powers of regulation, held that
Interstate's production and gathering had been completed at the
time of the sale and therefore regulation was of national rather than
local concern. It relied heavily upon the fact that Interstate had
used its interstate natural-gas company classification to avoid regulation by the State of Louisiana.
The most shocking example of judicial legislation in the natural gas field was enacted on June 7, 1954, when the Supreme Court
upheld in the case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin l the reversal by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of the Commission order finding it had no jurisdiction over an independent
producer. The Commission had found as a fact that Phillips' relevant operations consisted of production and gathering within the
express exemption of the Natural Gas Act and that rate regulation
by a federal agency would be inconsistent and a substantial interference with state regulatory functions. Such fact findings, heretofore binding upon an appellate court, were breezily dismissed
as "without adequate basis at law" by the five-man majority. The
bare majority attempted to use the Interstate case to justify their
position on the exemption, but in that case the state did not
oppose the federal regulation whereas in Phillips the producing
states had actively opposed the Court of Appeals action in reversing the Commission. As a matter of fact, the Court partially
repudiated the Interstate case by holding that "the jurisdiction of
U.S. 581, 65 Sup.Ct. 829, 89 L.Ed. 1206 (1945).
266, 94 L.Ed. 268 (1950).
59 68 Stat. 36, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
60331 U.S. 682, 67 Sup.Ct. 1482, 91 L.Ed. 1742 (1947).
61347 U.S. 672, 74 Sup.Ct. 794, 98 L.Ed. 1035 (1954).
57324

58338 U.S. 464, 70 Sup.Ct.
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the Federal Power Commission was not intended to vary from state
to state, depending upon the degree
62 of state regulation and of
state opposition to federal control."
But the real repudiation of stare decisis was of the Panhandle
Eastern case. Compare the language of that case as set out above
with these pervasive words of the five-man Phillips decision:
Me
W. believe that the legislative history indicates a con". .
gressional intent to give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates
of all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by
a pipeline company or not and whether occurring before,3during or
after transmission by an interstate pipeline company."
A strong dissent by Justice Clark characterized the majority
opinion as contrary to the intention of Congress and the understanding of the states as well as the Commission. Justice Douglas
filed a separate dissent emphasizing the factual aspects of the
case showing Phillips operations to be local and the sales to be
incidental to those operations.
Congress responded in the next session with the Harris Bill,
which was designed to eliminate the confusion caused by the
Phillips judicial legislation. Unfortunately, President Eisenhower
vetoed this bill which he described as good legislation for allegedly improper lobbying.
The Phillips case represents the bootstrap by which the Supreme Court seeks to legislate state control over gas conservation
out of existence. Upon this shaky foundation of a five-man, congressionally-repudiated decision, another five men have sought
to deprive the states of their regulatory power in the Kansas case.
The effect of this decision upon the states and the industry
can be gauged by the fact that fifteen major oil and gas produring states submitted for the court's consideration a brief which
warned that chaos would result from striking down ratable-take
orders upon which conservation for protection of correlative rights
is built. The Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association also filed
a "friend-of-the-court" brief stressing the necessity of state ratabletake authority for efficient and equitable conservation.
Subsequent to the decision, former Texas lailroad Commissioner Murray testified before the FTC in the Permian Basin Area
Rate case that as he understood the majority opinion the Railroad
Commission no longer has the "power to compel an interstate
pipeline to purchase gas ratably... ." He added "if pipeline companies are permitted to selectively purchase producers' allowables,
it may very well develop that the effectiveness of state regulatory
proration authority has been critically impaired." 04
In addition, the Kansas Corporation Commission applied for
62

Id. at 681, 74 Sup.Ct. at 798, 98 L.Ed. at 1047.

63 347 U.S. at 682, 74 Sup.Ct. at 799, 98 L.Ed. at 1047.
64 Dallas Morning News, March 24, 1963.
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and was denied a rehearing before the U. S. Supreme Court. 5
Mincing no words, the motion for rehearing charged that the holding violates congressional intent, that the majority misunderstood
the facts and that the assumption the ratable-take order would
impair FPC authority was without basis in fact. The Kansas Commission concluded: "The decision, if allowed to stand, substantially impairs, if it does not destroy, state regulation of gas conservation in its historic sense. All state control will fall . . . if the

reasoning of the majority opinion is consistently applied." 6
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Where do federal courts find authority to legislate long-recognized state conservation powers out of existence? Certainly it
is not Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, which
states: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."
And it certainly is not the 10th Amendment, which clearly
specifies that "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people."
In the Northern Natural case, five justices claim that if state
authority cannot practically regulate a given area, "then we are
impelled to decide that federal authority governs." 7 The Natural
Gas Act passed by Congress contains no such language. Apparently these five men believe lack of regulation is illegal and that
state ratable-take regulations which have existed for fifty years
are impractical.
No constitutional citation is given for this claim; indeed, the
Constitution is not mentioned in the decision. The commerce
clause is68 referred to in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n in which a state proration order was upheld against a
challenge under that clause. Yet it is the commerce clause from
which must spring whatever power the federal government has to
regulate gas. The clause-one of 18 under Article I, Section 8grants Congress power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." It granted no power to the Supreme Court.
Congress remained within its delegated power by limiting the
1938 Natural Gas Act to the transportation and sale for resale
of natural gas in interstate commerce and by specifically exempting production or gathering. It remained for five Supreme Court
members to find in the 1954 Phillips case "congressional intent to
give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all wholesales
65

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas, -U.S.-, 83 Sup.Ct. 1011, 10
L.Ed.2d 014 (1963).
GGSupra note 64.
67 83 Sup.Ct. at 651, 9 L.Ed.2d at *608.
68286 U.S. 210, 52 Sup.Ct. 559, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932).
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of natural gas in interstate commerce. .. whether occurring before, during or after transmission by an interstate pipeline company."69
How does gas get into interstate commerce before transmission? Physically, of course, it cannot. Rhetorically, the Supreme
Court concocted an explanation in Wickard v. Fillburn,70 a 1942
case approving a fine imposed by the Federal Agriculture Department upon a man for planting more wheat for his own consumption than the Department permitted. The Court there held that
even if an "activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."7 1 In another case, United States v. Darby,72 the Federal Supreme Court pulled out all the stops: "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation
of commerce among the states."7 3 Comparing such language with
the constitutional language forebodes the further assertion that
such power "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce . . . as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end" 74-briefly, the
end justifies the means. From there the court found it a small
step to ruling that the "federal commerce power is as broad as
the economic needs of the nation."75 All could agree that, judged
by our debt, such need is more than $800 billion broad, but as
a legal principle, who is to decide the "economic needs of the
nation'-the Supreme Court? Not by any authority of the U. S.
Constitution!
To claim that the power to regulate commerce among the
states is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the
states is not only nonsense, it is usurpation-particularly in view
of the stringent limitations of the 10th Amendment. These prior
usurpations were made by the Court to extend congressional power; the Northern Natural case extends not the power of Congress
-Congress specifically denied such an extension-but extends
the federal commerce power by unconstitutional judicial legislation.
REMEDIAL ACTION
A system of checks and balances is inherent within our constitutional system of government. This system has already proved
its worth in conjunction with the Natural Gas Act. In 1950, the
69 347 U.S. 672, 682, 74 Sup.Ct. 794, 799, 98 L.Ed. 1035, 1047-48 (1954).
70317 U.S. 111, 63 Sup.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942).
71 Id. at 125, 63 Sup.Ct. at 89, 87 L.Ed. at 135.
72 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941).
73 Id. at 118, 61 Sup.Ct. at 459, 85 L.Ed. at 619.
74
75 ibid.

American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 104, 67 Sup.Ct.
133, 141, 91 L.Ed. 103, 115 (1946).
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United States Supreme Court extended federal regulation to an
intrastate distribution company on the theory that the commerce
power was not restricted to the constitutional regulation of commerce "among the several states."7 6 Congress rectified this mistake
of the court by enacting the Hinshaw Amendment 77 which expressly
exempted all state-regulated gas distributors.
It is within the power of Congress to free gas producers from
federal regulation never intended by Congress. An amendment
which clearly and expressly exempts independent producers bAid
state regulatory orders from FTC jurisdiction would reaffirm the
constitutional mandate vesting exclusive legislative power in Congress.
Such congressional action would have far-reaching effects
even more beneficial than freeing the petroleum industry to resume developing fuel supplies necessary to meet the demands of
both the national economy and the national defense. Of still greater importance, such action would reassure us that our government
is to remain one of laws and not of men, that no branch of government may yet usurp powers constitutionally granted another
and that unconstitutional, socialistic control of production and distribution by government will not be tolerated.
Congress does not bear sole responsibility for upholding our
system of government. Every lawyer has taken an oath to support
the Constitution of the United States; indeed the first object of
the American Bar Association is "to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States and maintain representative government ... ."78 The Constitution can be upheld and representative
government maintained only so long as the legislative power remains in the hands of the Congress elected by the people. The
Kansas decision is one that should provoke all lawyers-and particularly those associated with the petroleum industry-to petition
their representatives to restore and reassert Constitutional legislaive authority with respect to the Natural Gas Act.
70 F.P.C. v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 70 Sup.Ct. 266, 94 LEd.
268 (1950).
7768 Stat. 36, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
7849 A.B.A.J. 1031 (1963).
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